Wittgenstein (from Philosophical Grammar):
"A thought experiment [gedankenexperiment] comes to much the same as an experiment which is sketched or painted or described instead of being carried out. And so the result of a thought experiment is the fictitious result of a fictitious experiment."
A sketch or a painting or a description of an experiment is not an experiment. Wittgenstein did not refer to his ideas as "thought experiments", and he rejected this phrase - for blisteringly obvious reasons - as being "ungrammatical". Above - to Witt, a thought experiment is a "fictitious experiment". He would not have entitled any of his books with such a contradictory phrase.
Ideas about experiments are not experiments. Experiments cannot occur in mind-dependent contexts, i.e. in the human imagination. For an experiment to occur, it must take place under mind-independent conditions - that only the world (which exists beyond and outside of human minds) provides.
In 1897, Mach introduced the phrase "gedankenexperiment" (thought experiment) to the world. Prior to that - for a few decades, it had currency among German physicists. When funding was non-existent or a planned experiment was technically infeasible to implement, physicists pondered how possible experiments might turn out. They used them as "substitutes" for experiments. However, an experiment was required to "translate" the imagined experiment into fact (existence). Physicists (Mach and Einstein), being physicists, knew that "thought experiments" were products of the imagination. For Galileo to have referred to what he wrote as "gedankenexperiments", he would have had to have spoken German 300 years into his future.
To play with an idea is not to experiment. To confuse an idea about an experiment in the province of a thinker's mind with an experiment conducted in the province of a scientist's lab is a category mistake.
Wittgenstein's approach to language has been so pitifully mauled, mutilated and murdered by you into an occult doctrine; whereby - since meanings shift over time, whatever gibberish humans eruct is logically flawless, i.e. "An imaginary experiment is an experiment", "a tall man is not a man", "a maple tree is a rubber chicken", etc.
Again, the only way that this German phrase, "gedankenexperiment", could have been in vogue during "Galileo's time" is if the people in Renaissance Italy spoke German 300 years into their future. Your linguistic, historical and scientific anachronism is stunning. It - literally - takes my breath away.
Throughout this counter-logical debacle, you appealed to an imaginary, linguistic tradition, stretching-back to "Galileo's time" - in which you stated that the phrase "thought experiment" was spoken by human beings, and you invoked this imaginary tradition to leverage the case that non-actual (thought) experiments were experiments. Your entire "argument" was predicated on a non-actual human history and the existence of non-actual experiments. Even though I pointed these blunders out in excruciating detail, you're incapable of recognizing that your blunders defuse your argument.
There's a long tradition/common usage/speech community, involving the religious phrases: "demonic possession", "miracle of transubstantiation" and "holy savior"; therefore - according to your balmy mis-interpretation of linguistic philosophy, people are possessed by the devil, wine and crackers turn into the blood and flesh of Christ and a holy savior exists - because speakers in the unbroken, Christian speech community verbalized these phrases for over the course of ~2Kyr.
How does the mere persistence - alone - of a phrase-usage-tradition convert an imaginary (mind-dependent) experiment into a real experiment? Could a 2 Byr duration of a speech-tradition turn an imaginary (mind-dependent) wombat into a real wombat?