Thrice - in detail, I drew-out the criticism of epistemic zombie possibility. Khuno would not deign to respond to it, declaring "No" and "Fuck off".
Wittgenstein wrote in his 1932-33 Lectures:
"Russell said remembering cannot prove that what is remembered has occurred, because the world might have sprung into existence five minutes ago with acts of remembering intact."
Wittgenstein goes on:
"Russell's hypothesis was so arranged that nothing could bear it out or refute it. Hence, it is that such sentences seem to mean something. But they are otiose, like wheels in a watch which have no function although they do not look to be useless."
Following Witt, both Russell's hypothesis and Khuno's bellowing are otiose. They appear to be constructed gramatically, and they seem to refer to states of affairs, operating in the world. However, Russell believed that he needed no evidence to sustain his "human memories are possibly unreliable" hypothesis. Khuno - too - deceives himself that no evidence is needed to back-up the possible existence of zombies and that their possible existence contains an "implication for consciousness". As Witt said: "nothing could bear it out or refute it.". Both statements are unfalsifiable gobs of slobbering gibberish.
Suppose that a theist went on to ramble:
The theist would be subject to the torrents of abuse, snarling contempt and derision, characteristic of this crack-pot cult. Why the double-standards?
N.B. I never wrote: "it's not an epistemic possibility.". Zombies are logically possible, i.e. a humanoid being could exist and function without qualia, but - following Searle and Dennett, I do not think it physically possible for such cockamamie creatures to exist.