Zombie memory

Joe wrote:
Thrice - in detail, I drew-out the criticism of epistemic zombie possibility. Khuno would not deign to respond to it, declaring "No" and "Fuck off".

Khuno wrote:: To say that the zombie possibility has no implications for consciousness BEGS THE QUESTION. Saying that zombies don't exist FOR ALL YOU KNOW (that it's not an epistemic possibility) misses the meaning of the possibility and its implication for consciousness.

Wittgenstein wrote in his 1932-33 Lectures:

"Russell said remembering cannot prove that what is remembered has occurred, because the world might have sprung into existence five minutes ago with acts of remembering intact."

Wittgenstein goes on:

"Russell's hypothesis was so arranged that nothing could bear it out or refute it. Hence, it is that such sentences seem to mean something. But they are otiose, like wheels in a watch which have no function although they do not look to be useless."

Compare:: (1) To say that Russell's hypothesis has no implications for memory-reliability BEGS THE QUESTION. Saying that the world did not spring into existence 5 minutes ago FOR ALL YOU KNOW (that it's not an epistemic possibility) misses the meaning of the possibility and its implications for memory-reliability.

And -

Khuno: (2) "To say that the zombie possibility has no implications for consciousness BEGS THE QUESTION. Saying that zombies don't exist FOR ALL YOU KNOW (that it's not an epistemic possibility) misses the meaning of the possibility and its implication for consciousness."

Following Witt, both Russell's hypothesis and Khuno's bellowing are otiose. They appear to be constructed gramatically, and they seem to refer to states of affairs, operating in the world. However, Russell believed that he needed no evidence to sustain his "human memories are possibly unreliable" hypothesis. Khuno - too - deceives himself that no evidence is needed to back-up the possible existence of zombies and that their possible existence contains an "implication for consciousness". As Witt said: "nothing could bear it out or refute it.". Both statements are unfalsifiable gobs of slobbering gibberish.

Suppose that a theist went on to ramble:

theist: To say that the possibility of God's existence has no implications for your eternal salvation BEGS THE QUESTION. Saying that God doesn't exist FOR ALL YOU KNOW (that it's not an epistemic possibility) misses the meaning of the possibility and its implication for the salvation of your immortal soul.

The theist would be subject to the torrents of abuse, snarling contempt and derision, characteristic of this crack-pot cult. Why the double-standards?

N.B. I never wrote: "it's not an epistemic possibility.". Zombies are logically possible, i.e. a humanoid being could exist and function without qualia, but - following Searle and Dennett, I do not think it physically possible for such cockamamie creatures to exist.